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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue One: 
Whether minimal due process requires actual notice before a lawyer's property interest in 
a license to practice may be destroyed? 
A. May OPC evade due process requirements by the label it places on a 
"suspension"? 
B. Does Rule of Lawyer Discipline and Disability ("RLDD") 8(b) apply to the facts 
here to achieve that result? 
C. Hasn!t this issue been decided in In re Crandall, 784 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1989)? 
This is a legal issue which should be reviewed for correctness. In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 
207 (Utah 1997). 
Issue Two: 
Was Judge Stirba correct in finding that OPC did not comply with Rule for Integration 
C20? 
This is a legal issue which should be reviewed for correctness. In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 
207 (Utah 1997). 
Issue Three: 
Can OPC tell Judge Stirba that it did not look to RLDD 8(b) for the Bar's alleged 
authority to administratively suspend lawyers then appeal based on her failure to consider RLDD 
8(b)? 
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Sonnenreich accepts OPC's Statement of jurisdiction and of the Case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A lawyer has a due process property right in a license to practice law. Minimal due 
process standards were not satisfied when OPC used an "administrative suspension" as to which 
Sonnenreich had neither actual or constructive knowledge to strip her of her license, then punish 
her for "practicing" or "holding out" as a lawyer while suspended. 
Sonnenreich's due process rights were violated by the following: 
1) Although she has a good faith issue as to how her Bar dues payment was 
processed, there was no mechanism to raise the dispute. State ex rel Schwab, 493 P.2d 1237 
(Wash. 1972). 
2) Sonnenreich was entitled to actual notice. In re Schwenke, 849 P.2d 573 (Utah 
1993). 
3) OPC used the administrative suspension to end-run its usual burden of proof and 
bootstrap itself into a discipline charge. In re Crandall, 784 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1989). 
4) OPC failed to inform Sonnenreich as to what she allegedly did that constitutes 
practicing law or holding out. In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 
544(1967). 
OPC has conducted this matter in flagrant disregard of the rules that this Court has 
established for the conduct of lawyer discipline in Utah. Specifically: 
1) At different times it presented no fewer than three different and inconsistent 
sources for what empowered the Bar to "administratively suspend" Sonnenreich. 
2) It cannot produce the notice of removal from the rolls that is required by RLDD 
8(b). 
3) It did not follow Rule C20 of the Rules for Integration. It then engaged in 
completely improper conduct to hide the correct version of that Rule. 
4) It did not follow RLDD 11(a) in that it failed to plead facts and did not premise 
the complaint on a screening panel finding of probable causes that there are grounds for public 
discipline. 
Judge Burton did not abuse his discretion in finding bad faith. The record is rich with 
evidence that OPC has abused its prosecutorial authority, abused the screening panel process, 
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failed to deal candidly with the tribunal and launched this action without being able to produce 
any notice of suspension or articulate even an allegation describing the events and circumstances 
underlying the claimed offense. 
Finally, OPC has also failed to meet its obligations as an appellant. It: 
1) Attacked Judge Stirba for accepting the very argument as to the source of the Bar's 
authority that OPC made. 
2) Failed to appeal from Judge Stirba's analysis concerning the effect of the 
screening panel report. 
3) Failed to be candid concerning Rule for Integration C20 (and to adequately brief 
the issue). 
4) Failed to marshal the evidence in support of Judge Burton. 
ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case involves the administration of this Court's rules governing the practice of law. 
It involves the Bar's administrative activity in processing dues payments and in identifying tardy 
payers. It involves the Rules for Integration and the way in which the Court has determined 
unauthorized practice should be prevented. In this case the Bar did not handle dues payments 
and record keeping well. OPC got into the act and maladministered the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, the Rules for Integration, this Court's 
case authority, and the Rules of Procedure. 
Judge Stirba dismissed the complaint on a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings which 
was converted into a summary judgment because both sides submitted evidentiary material. In 
those proceedings OPC exhibited extreme bad faith and lack of candor and tried to bob and 
weave around its complete lack of facts, evidence, probable cause and legal authority to support 
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its position. Later, when Sonnenreich moved for attorneys' fees, OPC continued its lack of 
candor and its misuse of authority. Judges Stirba and Burton followed the RLDDs, the Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Rules for Integration and the cases. 
Now OPC has appealed and the case is subject to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and the standards developed by this court under them. RLDD 17 provides: 
(a) Additional Rules of Procedure. Proceedings governed by rules civil 
procedure, appellate procedure, evvidence. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure governing civil 
appeals, and the Utah Rules of Evidence apply in formal discipline actions and disability 
actions. 
This case is to be judged as other civil appeals. Cf., In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 215 
(Utah 1997). 
In considering OPC's appeal, this court will find that OPC has failed to preserve issues, 
failed to marshal evidence, urged positions contrary to those urged below and generally 
continued its lack of candor respecting the rules, its burden and its role, and failed to meet its 
burden of persuasion. 
II. FACTS. 
A. Facts Concerning the Lack of Notice. 
1. This matter arises from the Utah Bar's "administrative suspension" of hundreds of 
lawyers and judges in September, 1999 for allegedly failing to timely pay bar fees. The Bar 
asserts that Sonnenreich was among those suspended. R 60-66;R 112. 
2. It is undisputed in the record that no actual notice of the alleged suspension was 
received by Sonnenreich. R 51. 
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3. In July of 1999 Sonnenreich changed her address of record with the Bar from her 
office in the headquarters building of the Salt Lake Tribune, her former employer, to her 
husband's downtown address at #9 Exchange Place. The transaction was handled by Bar 
employee, Caroline Hinckley, whom Sonnenreich identified by name in her affidavit. R 51. 
4. OPC did not present any contradictory evidence from Ms. Hinckley. OPC did not 
allege in its complaint (R 1-4) or in its Memorandum in Opposition To Sonnenreich Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings (R 88-207) that it had sent any type of notice to Sonnenreich. The 
complaint asserts that Sonnenreich's address of record was the Exchange Place address. R 1. 
5. Throughout this matter, including in the proceedings before Judge Burton, OPC 
failed to produce any evidence from anyone at the Bar saying that he or she had sent either a 
notice of suspension or of removal from the rolls to Sonnenreich. Before Judge Stirba, it produce 
an affidavit from Arnold Birrell, the Bar's accountant, that did not either state Sonnenreich's 
address of record or say that notice of suspension or removal from the rolls had been sent. 
R 111-113. 
6. OPC failed to produce anything purporting to be a 1999 suspension notice or 
notice of removal from the rolls from the Executive Director of the Utah Bar directed to 
Sonnenreich. 
B. Facts Concerning Selective and Arbitrary Prosecution. 
7. The record identifies attorneys who were referred to the Bar by the district court 
because their business with the court required a current bar license. For example, Wendy 
Hufnagel and Joyce Maughan paid their fees only after they were sent to the Bar by district court 
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clerks because they needed to make court appearances the day they were referred. R 68-69. OPC 
did not prosecute those attorneys. R 43; R 702-703. 
8. Sonnenreich, who had faxed the Bar a credit card number on the last day to pay 
without a late fee, was not caught by the district court. Rather, she voluntarily and immediately 
called the Bar to investigate after she learned from her husband (who was using the web site to 
find another attorney's address) that Sonnenreich had been listed as suspended on the Bar's web 
site. She learned that the Bar keeps no record of faxed transactions and that her card had not 
been charged. R 51. 
9. Sonnenreich was requested to file an explanation with the Bar, which she did. In 
response she received a phone call from OPC counsel Carol Stewart who called Sonnenreich a 
"liar" and demanded that she consent to a three month public suspension. Sonnenreich 
immediately wrote to Ms. Stewart's superior expressing her concern as to Ms. Stewart's behavior 
and objectivity. R 384; R 415. Sonnenreich's complaint was disclosed to Ms. Stewart. R 416. 
OPC failed to submit an affidavit from Ms. Stewart explaining her actions or contending that 
Sonnenreich's affidavit and letter did not accurately represent what Ms. Stewart said. 
10. Ms. Stewart scheduled a screening panel to investigate Sonnenreich for practicing 
while suspended. Ms. Stewart called several of Sonnenreich's former clients and colleagues, 
informing them she was investigating Sonnenreich's ethics. She contacted a law firm where 
Sonnenreich had not worked in a decade. R 653. Mr. Lowrie was among those contacted. Ms. 
Stewart gave him the impression that Sonnenreich had been suspended as a disciplinary matter 
and was being investigated for practicing after that. R 653. Ms. Stewart presented no evidence 
from any of those individuals she contacted to the screening panel, nor did she include any 
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factual allegations based on those calls in the complaint. R 419-420. OPC failed to provide any 
evidence as to why Ms. Stewart would believe those individuals would have any relevant 
information. R508 -509. Ms. Stewart styled herself as the complainant initiating the 
investigation. R 117. 
11. Before the panel, Sonnenreich candidly admitted she should have personally 
checked her credit card statements to make sure the Bar had in fact processed her card rather than 
relying on her spouse to remember to review the statement for any possible omissions. R 346, 
561. The screening panel found Sonnenreich had committed a single negligent violation of Rule 
5.5. It did not find that the violation caused any actual injury to a party, the public or the legal 
system nor actual interference with a legal proceeding. R 151 -156. 
12. OPC did not ask the screening panel to identify any facts underlying its finding 
and it did not do so. It is unclear whether the charge was based on Sonnenreich's hindsight 
admission that she should have checked her credit card. R 151- 156. 
13. Before Judge Burton, OPC provided no evidence concerning why Ms. Stewart 
chose Sonnenreich for prosecution while ignoring lawyers who were caught filing district court 
pleadings while tardy on fees. R 52, 53; R 491-515; R 905. 
14. The charge against Sonnenreich was screened with several other cases that OPC 
represented were factually "similar." R 122. OPC instructed the screening panel that the Supreme 
Court had authorized the suspensions. It told the panel: "Although this is an administrative 
suspension in the sense that no formal disciplinary action is taken... It is also a suspension 
imposed by the Utah Supreme Court." (Emphasis added). R 122. 
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15. The screening panel "voted discipline" as to all the cases. OPC, apparently 
however, ignored that instruction as to the other cases and filed only against Sonnenreich. R 53, 
R 43. R 702-703. It did not offer Judge Burton any explanation as to why it the ignored 
screening panel's instructions, but did not deny that it did so. R 905,R 491-515. 
16. On April 24, 2000, Ms. Stewart filed a district court complaint against 
Sonnenreich without mentioning or attaching the screening panel report. R 1-4. 
17. OPC did not seek or obtain approval under Rule for Integration C20 from the Bar 
Commission before it filed against Sonnenreich. R 41. 
C. Facts Concerning the Rules for Integration. 
18. On the same day OPC filed against Sonnenreich in district court, the Bar 
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for certain changes to the Rules for Integration. Only minor 
changes to Rule C20 were requested. Those changes were so insignificant they were not 
mentioned specifically in the petition although they were redlined: renumbering it to HIT; using 
"Utah" instead of within this state, making the language referring to lawyers gender inclusive; 
and adding a reference to foreign legal consultants. There was no request to remove the 
requirement for Board instigation of actions under the Rule. The redlined and the proposed final 
both use the language "Board" at IIIT. R 582-608. The text underlying the redline was the 
April 28, 1999 version. R 608. The specific changes to C20 are at R 604. The April 28, 1999 
version appears in the record at R 427-443, R 438-439 and reflects "Board" approval. 
19. On May 15, 2000, Chief Justice Howe signed an Order adopting "the amendments 
described in the petition" and making two additional minor amendments to Rule K2. The Court 
took no action to remove the requirement for Board instigation of complaints alleging holding 
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out or practicing while late in paying dues. R 241- 255. Justice Howe's order is stapled to the 
Proposed Final Version submitted with April petition. C20 now (HIT) appear as R 253. 
20. On June 9, 2000 Sonnenreich asked Judge Stirba to dismiss the case based in part 
on the Bar's non-compliance with Rule C20 in filing the district court action without getting 
Board approval as the rule required. R 40-43. Sonnenreich cited both Rule C20 and quoted the 
substantively identical statute in the Utah Code when the complaint was filed. 
21. On June 28 2000, OPC filed its response to Sonnenreich's motion to dismiss. 
OPC told Judge Stirba that Sonnenreich's authority was "outdated" and submitted its own 
version of the Rules for Integration that included a version of C20 (now numbered HIT), which 
omitted the requirement for Board instigation in favor of "Bar" institution, a condition arguably 
satisfied by the complaint. R 93, R 103-109, R 191-207. Exhibit J to Memorandum in 
Opposition To Motion for Judgment On [The] Pleadings. 
22. Rule C20 as amended in April 1999 was in effect when the action below was 
filed, a fact Sonnenreich pointed out in her reply memo dated July 20, 2000. She told OPC the 
exhibit with the new Rule IIIT it submitted "is not a copy of the current Rules of Integration 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court effective May 15, 2000. Nor is it a copy of those Rules, as 
they existed ... when this matter was filed." R 229. 
23. A copy of the rules actually approved in May of 2000 was attached as an exhibit 
along with a copy of Judge Howe's manually signed order adopting the May 2000 version. 
R 241-255. 
24. OPC did not immediately admit that it had submitted inapplicable rules. In its 
next pleading, after Judge Stirba had applied the correct version of Rule C20 to rule against it, 
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OPC referred to Sonnenreich as having raised "perceived inaccuracies" as to it version of the 
Rules for Integration. R 292. 
25. Sonnenreich's counsel sought to make absolutely sure that the district court was 
working from the correct Rules of Integration. OPC did not controvert the following evidence 
concerning OPC's behavior toward that effort: 
After Ms. Stewart has falsely asserted that Sonnenreich's authority was 
"outdated," Sonnenreich's counsel sought to examine the Bar's record copy of 
those rules, Ms. Stewart threatened him with disciplinary charges. In a voice mail 
message left by Counsel Stewart to Sonnenreich's counsel in response to a 
request from a paralegal to the Bar seeking the Bar's public record copy, 
Ms. Stewart asserted the following: "your employee [is] contacting directly a 
witness, an important witness in our case, and .. .we think is [sic] violative of 
Rule 4.2 and let me remind you that we are the experts in ethics in the state." She 
called later in the day to "cite you to 4.2(c)(2) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. In her phone message, she described the Rules for Integration as "a 
document you say is public." R 654-659. 
26. Later, in its memorandum opposing Sonnenreich's request for attorneys' fee, OPC 
abandoned its claim that Sonnenreich's version of C20 was "outdated" or "inaccurate." It 
constructed a new explanation as to why it submitted the rule that did not require Board approval 
to Judge Stirba. It claimed it erred by accidentally submitting the May 2000 version of Rule IIIT. 
R 505. It makes that same assertion on appeal. Brief at 25. 
27. OPC's claim is false. This Court did not change the word Board to Bar in May of 
2000. OPC knows that. It had the version signed by Judge Howe in its possession since July 20, 
2000. R 236. OPC was told that its "May version" of the Rules was no such thing. In 
Sonnenreich's reply on the attorneys' fee issue, she told OPC that its exhibit: "is not what the 
Chief Justice signed in May of 2000." R 549. OPC's sole factual basis for claiming it submitted 
the May version of the rules is that "May 15, 2000" appears at the bottom. R 505. It had no 
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explanation as to why its version is inconsistent with the Bar's April, 2000 petition and what 
Judge Howe signed in May, 2000. 
28. Indeed, although it appears from the current, published version of the Rules for 
Integration that the change from Board to Bar was made by this Court at some point, it has not 
been. It was the Bar that made it appear the Bar Commissioners had been stripped of their 
authority under Rule C20/IIIT. When the Bar petitioned this Court for additional changes to the 
Rules for Integration on February 1, 2001 (none of which addressed Rule HIT) it used the same 
incorrect version of HIT it had presented earlier to Judge Stirba as the original text underlying the 
redline version submitted with the petition. The change from Board to Bar was falsely treated as 
if the Court had already made it. This Court has not consciously changed the rule to match 
OPC's version- not in May of 2000, not ever. R 360. The underlying documents are included in 
the accompanying supplemental authorities. 
29. Sonnenreich was taking a break from downtown to be with her toddler during the 
summer of 1999. R51. Three years later she still doesn't know what she did to practice law. 
R51. 
III. THE RECORD SHOWS SONNENREICH NEVER RECEIVED NOTICE OF 
SUSPENSION, NOTHING IN THE RECORD SUPPORTS A CLAIM OF 
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE; ACTUAL NOTICE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
REQUIRED. 
A. Sonnenreich Did Not Receive Notice of Suspension. 
Sonnenreich's affidavit establishes she did not receive notice of suspension or removal 
from the rolls for failure to pay bar dues. R 51. OPC does not contravene the affidavit on that 
point. Sonnenreich's affidavit establishes that on approximately July 30, 1999 she faxed credit 
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card information and her changed address to the Bar within the period to pay without a late fee 
established by Bar rules. She was invited to do so by a Bar employee. R 51. OPC does not 
contravene this point either. 
The Bar, however, apparently failed to process the credit card payment. It claims it later 
sent a notice of suspension to her prior address - a prior employer. She never received that notice 
(R. 51) and no copy or exemplar of it has been made a part of the record at any stage of the case. 
OPC has failed to identify any factual or legal basis for claiming Sonnenreich had been 
"suspended" in view of its failure to produce the notice that OPC claims to have sent. No one-
not Judge Stirba, Judge Burton, Sonnenreich, nor this court-has ever known what the purported 
notice said. Because of this failure of proof, OPC never asked Judge Stirba to find either that the 
notice provisions of RLDD 8(b) are a sufficient protection of lawyers' and judges' due process 
rights or that any particular notice language complied with Rule 8(b). 
OPC cannot appeal on the basis that Judge Stirba did not make those arguments on its 
behalf. See Wisden v. Dixie College Parking Comm., 935 P.2d 550, fn. 2 (Utah 1997) ("failure 
to raise an issue below precludes its consideration on appeal.") 
OPC's Memorandum In Opposition To Motion for Judgment On the Pleadings contains a 
"Statement of Relevant Facts"; nowhere therein did OPC's even allege that notice was either sent 
or received. R 89-93. Nor did it allege in the complaint that notice was sent or received. R 1-4. 
On appeal, OPC "contends" that: "Sonnenreich had notice when the letter informing her 
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of the administrative suspension was sent by certified mail to the address she furnished to the 
Bar." Brief at 24.* The record contains no support for that naked assertion. 
It is undisputed that Sonnenreich advised the Bar of her new address. R 51. The record 
contains nothing showing OPC mailed Sonnenreich anything at the address Sonnenreich had put 
on record with the Bar. See R 1 (citing new address as address of record). The record does not 
contain a copy of OPC s purported notice. OPC addressed the notice issue in its memorandum 
before Judge Stirba only by arguing that it did not need to give notice; not by claiming that it 
complied with express requirements of RLDD 8(b). R 100. 
At oral argument, OPC asserted: "actual notice is not required," R 905, page 22. Its 
explanation as to when it would produce its evidence was: "Subsequently down the line the Bar 
hopes to meet its burden of proof with regard to due process and notice given." R 904 page 13 
(emphasis added).2 
As the plaintiff, OPC bears the burden of production of evidence. RLDD 17(c). Once 
Sonnenreich had submitted affidavits concerning the lack of notice, the Bar was compelled to 
present some contrary evidence if it had any. 
[T]he plaintifff ] has the ultimate burden of proving all the elements of his cause 
of action . . . [after defendant produced affidavit attacking elements of plaintiff s 
case]. Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), the burden then shifted to 
furthermore, OPC does not even contend that it followed RLDD 8(b). It does not 
contend that it was the Executive director who sent the notice or even that it was a notice of 
"removal from the rolls." Even if OPC's "contention" were a record fact, it still would not 
support a finding that the Bar complied with Rule 8(b). 
2That admission alone supports Judge Burton's determination that the complaint was 
launched in bad faith. Hope is an admirable virtue but it cannot justify filing a law suit. If 
"hoping" to meet the burden of proof serves to avoid summary judgment, no summary judgment 
will ever be granted. 
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[plaintiff] to provide some evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, in support of the 
essential elements of his claim. 
Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994), see also Schaer v. State ex el 
Dep't of Transp., 657 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Utah 1993). 
OPC's "hopes" and "contentions" fail its burden. 
On appeal OPC for the first time argues that Judge Stirba should have inferred notice 
from the affidavit from Arnold Birrell. Mr. Birrell said: (1) Sonnenreich had a history of tardy 
payment;3 and (2) that the Bar did not charge Sonnenreich's credit card or (3) mail her a sticker. 
OPC has never offered an explanation as to why Mr. Birrell's affidavit did not identify 
Sonnenreich's address of record or claim that notice had been sent let alone disclose the content 
of the notice. 
OPC argues that Mr. Birrell's Affidavit proves that "[t]he OPC considered Sonnenreich 
'on notice' concerning her administrative suspension." Brief at page 25. What OPC "considers" 
does not have the slightest probative value on the issue of whether notice complying with RLDD 
8(b) was either sent or received in 1999. Nor does it resolve the issue of what, if anything, the 
Executive Director sent - a notice of "suspension" or a notice that complied with Rule 8(b) and 
addressed a "removal from the rolls." 
3Sonnenreich knows nothing about the issue of prior alleged late payments and indicated 
as much in her affidavit. Until 1999, Sonnenreich's employers always directly paid her bar dues 
R 50. OPC's use of previous uncharged alleged bad conduct is itself a violation of due process 
since Sonnenreich has not been accused of misconduct as to her employers' tardy payment and 
has not had an opportunity to present a defense. See Lipson v. State Bar of California, 810 P.2d 
1007, 1010 (Cal. 1991) ("To find petitioner culpable based on uncharged conduct would be a 
denial of due process"). 
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If OPC had a good faith basis for thinking it could find some evidence to contradict that 
presented by Sonnenreich as to the notice issue, it could have explained why and moved for 
discovery under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). OPC's claim that it was relieved from 
seeking to invoke Rule 56(f) because "it considered the point [of notice] a peripheral one" is 
ridiculous. Brief at 25. The issue of notice was squarely raised before Judge Stirba and was a 
central point of the due process argument. Sonnenreich presented an affidavit, case law, and legal 
argument on the issue, all of which OPC ignored. OPC did not even suggest to Judge Stirba or 
later to Judge Burton that actual notice to Sonnenreich that she had been suspended could be 
inferred from the Birrell affidavit. Nor does it suggest to this Court from what portion of that 
affidavit the inference arises-that is probably because no portion of BirrelPs affidavit gives rise 
to the inference she received notice or knew the Bar had suspended her. 
Judge Stirba made the only finding possible on the record before her: (1) no notice in the 
record; (2) an unrebutted affidavit to the effect that no notice had been received; and (3) no 
request for further discovery. 
Sonnenreich cited OPC's failure to produce the notice as evidence that the case was 
brought without a factual basis and in bad faith. R 354. This afforded OPC a second opportunity 
to establish that it provided Sonnenreich with proper and adequate Rule 8(b) notice of 
suspension. 
In response, however, OPC merely told Judge Burton that it "contends" notice was given. 
It did not offer any supplement to the obviously inadequate affidavit of Mr. Birrell. R 492-493. 
Having lost before Judge Stirba because it failed to establish actual notice, OPC cannot seriously 
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assert that it still considered the issue "peripheral" in the context of a bad faith inquiry. Brief at 
page 25. 
Judge Burton's determination that OPC lacked a factual basis on the issue of notice was 
certainly not an abuse of discretion. To the contrary, it was the only conclusion the record 
supported. 
B. Constitutional Due Process Required that Sonnenreich Receive Actual Notice 
of Suspension before She is Charged for Practicing While Suspended. 
This Court has long recognized that Utah's lawyers and "[j]udges are entitled to the same 
basic due process protections afforded to other professionals because these protections are, 
indeed, fundamental rights which inure to the benefit of every citizen of this state." In re 
Worthen, 926 P.2d 853,877 (Utah 1996). The prior rulings of this Court on the importance of 
actual notice in suspension and disbarment cases are equally clear. Finding an order informing a 
lawyer of a 30 day suspension had been inadequately served, this Court said: 
We think that suspension and disbarment proceedings call for adherence to 
minimum requirements of procedural due process, including notice of a hearing 
and notice that the attorney's license has been restricted or withdrawn. We 
therefore hold that service by certified or registered mail must be on the attorney 
personally and cannot be accomplished by delivery to a common-area receptionist 
at the address of the attorney's office. Such delivery does not amount to 
constructive notice. Nothing in the record or in the findings disputes Schwenke 's 
claim that the signature on the return receipt was not that of his personal agent. 
We acknowledge that actual personal service will often be required when service 
by mail is ineffectual. However, in suspension or disbarment proceedings, actual 
notice is essential. (Emphasis added.) 
In re Discipline of Schwenke, 849 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added). 
OPC apparently believes the due process requirement does not arise until this court 
explicitly so holds in a four square case. Brief at 28. OPC argues without citation and discussion 
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of a single case that Sonnenreich's cases "concerned disciplinary suspensions not administrative 
suspensions for failure to pay annual licensing fees. There are fundamental differences between 
the two types of suspensions and because of these differences, the cases are not controlling." 
OPC Brief at 28. But by the end of its Brief, 15 pages later, OPC has not explained what those 
fundamental differences are. 
Sonnenreich submits that a professional license, including a license to practice law, once 
earned, is a property right that cannot be taken away without procedural due process: 
Once licenses are issued.... their continued possession may become essential in the 
pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action 
that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are 
not to be taken away without the procedural due process required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Stidham v. Peace Officers Standards and Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1150 (10th Cir. 2001). This 
Court has described the suspension of a lawyer's license as a consequence that is "tantamount to 
disbarment." In re Smith, 872 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah 1994) (internal citation omitted). Disbarment 
implicates due process rights. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1967). 
OPC's contention that it can use the label on the suspension to abrogate Sonnenreich's 
due process right in her law license is wrong. OPC neither recognizes the existence of Schwenke, 
OPC Brief at iii, nor provides any analysis based on policy or case law explaining why it can 
ignore due process basics, if it labels a suspension "administrative," and then can turn around and 
use that suspension as a predicate for practicing while suspended. 
"[T]he deprivation of a constitutional right does not depend on form. We must look at 
the substance of the actions taken relative to a constitutionally protected right." Westborough 
Mall Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 794 F.2d 330, 336 (8th Cir. 1986). The substance of the 
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action taken against Sonnenreich clearly constituted the deprivation of a constitutionally 
protected property right without due process of law. "Procedural due process is implicated any 
time a lawyers' right to practice is even temporarily suspended." People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 6 
(Colo. 1996). 
Had Sonnenreich's license been jeopardized because she was accused of serious 
misconduct there would be no doubt as to her entitlement to actual notice and an opportunity to 
defend herself. Had she like Schwenke been suspended for 30 days because she had done 
something wrong for which she was being punished, she would unquestionably be entitled to 
actual knowledge of that fact. Sonnenreich submits that notice of a putative suspension must be 
given her, if she is to be charged with a violation for practicing law after the date of the so-called 
"administrative" suspension.4 
State ex rel Schwab, 493 P.2d 1237 (Wash. 1972) is instructive.5 Schwab, an attorney, 
deliberately refused to pay his bar dues in order to challenge the Washington Bar's administrative 
suspension power. The Washington Supreme Court agreed with the attorney that the State Bar 
could not jeopardize his right to practice law by imposing an "administrative" suspension 
although one was authorized by a statute. 
The Schwab court recognized the use of an administrative suspension as a ministerial 
tool. However it was clear that attorneys must be able to "challenge" the suspension, that is 
4No where in the RLDD, Rules for Integration or RPC does the adjective "administrative" 
appear before the word suspension. 
5Schwab has been cited favorably by this Court twice in other contexts. See In re 
[Robert] Hansen, 584 P.2d 805 fh2 (Utah 1978); In re [Phil] Hansen, 586 P.2d 413 fn4 (Utah 
1978). 
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explain the circumstances of the non-payment when there is a genuine controversy. The court 
held that, when there is a good faith defense, the Bar-imposed administrative suspension could 
not "[jeopardize the attorney's] authority to practice law." Nor did it render him "[subject] to the 
possibility of criminal prosecution under [a Washington statute] which makes it unlawful for 
anyone to practice while suspended from membership in the state bar." Id. at 1239. OPC's 
attempt to distinguish Schwab on the basis that the suspension there was based on a statute begs 
the question: So what? Whether the administrative suspension language appears in a statute or 
rule does not affect the constitutional right of due process of those who are suspended. Schwab 
is well-reasoned and should be accepted for this point. 
Sonnenreich was provided no mechanism to raise the legitimate dispute over dues 
payment issues or to correct the non-payment. Instead the Bar putatively "suspended" her, gave 
her no actual notice, and then OPC prosecuted her for misconduct based solely on so-called 
"administrative suspension." This action violates due process and is contrary to this court's 
holding in Schwenke and the principals recognized in Worthen and Schwab. 
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IV. IN RE CRANDALL CONTROLS. 
In re Crandall, 784 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1989) controls the case before the court.6 In 
Crandall the court ruled that in an attorney discipline case an administrative suspension by the 
Bar could not be the predicate for discipline for violations caused by the administrative 
suspension. 784 P.2d 1197. Crandall controls this case in two ways. OPC seeks to discipline 
Sonnenreich for practicing while administratively suspended, even though there is no evidence of 
any other form of misconduct by Sonnenreich. That effort is precisely what Crandall forbids and 
precisely what Section C20 of the applicable Rules for Integration provides be handled by the 
Board of Bar Commissioners through the institution of civil litigation.7 
Second, OPC in its printed screening panel decision sheets purports to make a finding of 
any rule violation of RPC 8.4.8 In Sonnenreich's case OPC would have the practice of law while 
^Crandall was administratively suspended and, pursuant to then Rule XX, the Bar 
continued the suspension after he tendered payment. He was then charged with ethics violations 
that this Court agreed "were either caused or aggravated by his [administrative] suspension and 
its indefinite extension." Id. at 1197. 
This Court told the Bar that had misused the administrative suspension procedure by 
using it as "end-run approach" to allow it to avoid following the procedures for suspending 
lawyers set out in the rules. Id. at 1196. It noted that "there is no logical connection between an 
attorney's failure to pay his or her licensing fee and any claimed unfitness to practice law." Id. at 
1196. 
The court dismissed five charges against Crandall because they "all arose from situations 
which were either caused or aggravated by his Rule XX suspension and its indefinite 
extension..." The Court told the Bar that it was "free to seek discipline under the rules for any 
claimed unprofessional behavior that was not caused by Crandall's suspension under rule XX." 
Id. at 1197 (emphasis added). 
7See Point V, infra. 
8OPC's form is discussed in more detail at Point VII, infra. 
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suspended automatically bootstrapped into a violation warranting public discipline, even though 
the screening panel found her practicing while suspended to be the product of negligence, not 
willfulness, and even though the screening panel expressly declined to find any harm done to any 
one, including the legal system. OPC has again done exactly what this Court told OPC it could 
not do, and Judge Stirba rebuffed it. After discussing CrandalVs holding, she said: 
By premising Sonnenreich's violation of Rule 5.5, which forbids 
practicing while suspended, on an administrative suspension, the Bar is doing 
exactly what the court forbade in CrandalL Indeed, Sonnenreich's violation of 
Rule 5.5 was caused by the administrative suspension and was not premised on 
the OPC demonstrating Sonnenreich had "irreparably" damaged the public and 
committed a violation of the code of professional conduct or was suffering from a 
disability . . . . (R 285-86) 
This court should affirm Judge Stirba's application of CrandalL9 
9OPC's Brief presents the holding in Crandall backwards. OPC argues that Crandall is 
distinguishable: 
because the allegations the OPC raised [against Sonnenreich] are directly related to the 
administrative suspension-in Crandall, many of the additional complaints derived from 
wholly unrelated conduct, some of it even preceding Crandall's administrative suspension. 
Brief at 19-20. 
OPC seems to argue that Crandall left open a window, between the "administrative 
suspension" and the receipt of payment, during which OPC may prosecute. That result defies 
both the logic and the language of CrandalL OPC does not explain how the use of the 
administrative suspension to "end run" normal discipline was any different before the payment 
was offered. If the Court meant to allow to prosecution of Crandall for actions before his 
payment was offered, leaving the initial period of the administrative suspension intact, the Court 
would not have "return[ed] Crandall to the status quo; he is now in the same position he was in 
the day before his administrative suspension." Instead it would have returned him to he same 
status he was in the day he offered his payment. Id. at 1197. 
OPC failed before Judge Stirba and Judge Burton to cite a single case in which an 
administrative suspension has been imposed against a lawyer who has a 
good faith defense and then successfully used as a "suspension" for the purpose of imposing Bar 
discipline. 
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V. RULE FOR INTEGRATION C20 ALSO DISPOSES OF THIS MATTER. 
This action was not initiated by the Board of Bar Commissioners. R 41 Rule C20 of the 
Rules of Integration in force at the time the complaint was filed, however, embodies a direct 
instruction from this Court on the issue: 
No person who is not duly admitted and licensed to practice law within this state 
nor any person whose right or license to so practice has terminated either by 
disbarment, suspension, failure to pay his license fee or otherwise, shall practice 
or assume to act or hold himself out to the public as a person qualified to practice 
or carry on the calling of an attorney within the state. . . . this prohibition 
against the practice of law by any such person shall be enforced by civil 
action or proceedings, including writ, contempt or injunctive proceedings, as 
may be necessary and appropriate, which action or which proceedings shall be 
instituted by the Board.10 (Emphasis added) 
Rule of Integration C20, April 28, 1999. R 438-439. 
That direct instruction requires the Board to initiate any district court action accusing a 
lawyers of practicing or holding out as a lawyer while tardy on fees. Faced with Rule C20, OPC 
offered Judge Stirba a different version of the rules which were not in force when the action was 
filed and which had not been properly adopted. The version then proffered said the action could 
be initiated by the Bar. R205. Judge Stirba rejected that tactic. R28711 On this appeal, OPC 
refers to the mis-submission of rules as an inadvertent oversight and attempts to trivialize the 
significance of the issue. It fails to quote the language at issue then asserts that "[t]he differences 
between the two versions of the rules are insubstantial" brief at 15. OPC brief is not adequate in 
10The Board is the Board of Bar Commissioners. (See April 19, 1999, Rules for 
Integration B.l (R428).) 
nOPC now takes the position it is a mistake to confuse the Bar with OPC, (Brief at note 
6). Hence the tactic before Judge Stirba does not pass muster anyway because it was clearly OPC 
who initiated the proceeding. 
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this regard. State v. Reiners, 803 P.2D 1300 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The difference is in fact 
crucial. Rule C20 required Board approval, which OPC did not obtain. Judge Stirba was correct 
in dismissing the Complaint on that basis. R 287. OPC now instead claims that the authority 
exists in RLDD 11 for it to act. This new theory, never presented to the district court, would give 
dual jurisdiction to OPC and the Board of Bar Commissioners to initiate actions for practicing 
without paying dues-something not even hinted at by the rules. And because it was not 
presented below, that argument cannot become the basis for reversal on appeal. Wisden v. Dixie 
College Parking Comm., 935 P.2d 550, fn.2 (Utah 1997).12 
VI. OPC TOLD JUDGE STIRBA THAT RULE 8(b) OF THE RLDD WAS NOT THE 
SOURCE OF ITS POWER OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION. IT CANNOT 
NOW ACCUSE HER OF ERROR FOR AGREEING WITH IT. 
Sonnenreich is accused of violating, RPC 5.5, prohibiting "unauthorized practice." The 
rule is content neutral. See committee note to RPC 5.5. OPC had to look to other authority to 
support it's claim that Sonnenreich was "suspended." 
Judge Stirba ruled the Bar lacked the authority to impose the administrative suspension 
upon which OPC predicated its claim that Sonnenreich practiced while suspended. OPC 
challenges Judge Stirba5s conclusion but its sole basis for the challenge is the argument that 
Rule 8(b) LRDD authorizes such suspensions.13 The use of the phrase "while suspended" 
12OPC has not dealt candidly with C 20 and the Rules of Integration in this matter. See 
Discussion at Point IX D, infra. 
13RLDD 8(b) says: 
(b) Suspension for non-payment of licensing fee. Any attorney who shall practice 
law while suspended for non-payment of the license fee violates the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and may be disciplined for practicing while suspended for 
non-payment of dues. The Executive Director of the Bar shall give notice of such 
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denotes that Rule 8(b) does not do the suspending. The court should also note that the Executive 
Director does not (as OPC says) send a "notice of suspension." He or she is to send a "notice of 
such removal from the rolls," language consistent with the Rules for Integration. 
The suspension to which the rule refers may be read, consistently with Crandall 's 
holding, as a suspension pursued without an end-run of OPC s burden. Crandall left the 
theoretical power of administrative suspension, but refused to allow such a suspension to end-run 
the burden of proof Again, Rule 8(b) is careful, it does not say a lawyer who is 
"administratively suspended." The Bar's two potential remedies for tardy Bar dues are then: (1) 
suspend the lawyer under a suspension that does not let OPC end-run its burden. (Schwab tells 
us a simple procedure that allows a challenge when there is a basis for one will suffice); and 
(2) follow Rule for Integration C20 (HIT). The current rules do not provide for option 1, so it is 
option 2 OPC should have followed. OPC adamantly told Judge Stirba the rule was not the 
authority for administrative suspensions: 
The Bar's current authority to administratively suspend an attorney for 
noncompliance can be found in two places: the Rules for Integration and the 
Bar's formal and Board-approved licensing policies and procedures. ... 
R100. 
removal from the rolls to such non-complying member at the address on record at 
the Bar, to the Utah Supreme Court and to the judges of the district courts. The 
non-complying member may apply in writing for re-enrollment by tendering the 
license fees and an additional $100 delinquent fee. Upon receiving the same, the 
Board of Commissioners shall accept it and order re-enrollment. Re-enrollment 
based on suspension for non-payment does not negate any orders of discipline. 
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The Bar was adamant in telling Judge Stirba that Rule 8 was not the source of its 
authority and indeed that no part of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline or Disability could confer 
such authority: 
As Respondent's Motion... correctly assumes, Rule 8 is not the 
authoritative source for administrative suspensions. Subsection 8(a) of Rule 8 
merely restates the requirement to pay licensing fees set forth in the Rules for 
Integration and subsection (b) is the basis for disciplinary action in connection 
with an administratively suspended attorney who continues to engage in the 
practice of law. 
R 101 (emphasis added). 
And at the very end of its oral argument, OPC told Judge Stirba: 
Now, my last point-and, again, this is a very important point... 
Rule 8 of the Lawyer-of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability... 
was enacted in 1993, April of'93, so it was in place at the time Ms. Sonnenreich 
was administratively suspended. It does not grant the authority to administratively 
suspend for nonpayment.... 
R 904, page 17. 
OPC "invited the alleged error below" and obviously cannot base an appeal on the 
grounds that Judge Stirba should have disagreed with the position the Bar advocated before her. 
See American Graphics, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 17 Fed. Appx 787 (10th Cir. 
2001) (the requirement that issues be preserved for appeal would be destroyed if parties could 
"invite the error" then appeal from it.) As this Court noted in another context, "it might be 
observed that [the party] asked for what he got, and to use such request as a crowbar to release 
him from his predicament, is to invite error, a tactic or stratagem upon which courts frown or 
outrightly reject." State v. Maguire, 529 P.2d 421, 422 (Utah 1974). 
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VII. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT ALLEGE THE REQUIRED SCREENING 
PANEL FINDING; THE SCREENING PANEL FAILED TO FIND THAT 
"THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR PUBLIC DISCIPLINE." 
RLDD 11 establishes two prerequisites before a district court complaint can be filed 
accusing a lawyer of unethical conduct. RLDD 11 limits such complaints to situations in which a 
"screening panel finds probable cause to believe that there are grounds for public discipline and 
that a formal complaint is merited." RLDD 11 (a)(emphasis added). 
Here, the complaint does not allege such a finding because the screening panel never 
determined that there was probable cause to believe that there were grounds for public discipline. 
OPC's Complaint was not based on the screening panel report it did not refer to it nor was it 
attached. The report was first produced in connection with the OPC's responsive memo before 
Judge Stirba. R 151-156. 
Judge Stirba examined that report and found that the screening panel had told OPC that 
Sonnenreich's offense14 was committed "negligently" the panel did not find harm to anyone or 
the administration of justice. A quick examination of the screening panel report indicates that the 
panel did not follow the instructions and never made a finding of grounds for public discipline. 
The instructions recognize three situations that warrant a "formal complaint."15 The 
pertinent pages of the screening panel report appear at R 154-55. 
14OPC never asked the screening panel to identify the facts underlying the offense. It 
appears that the offense it found was perhaps some sort of negligence in not making sure the 
payment was processed. 
15The form OPC gave the screening panel never asks it to determine whether a district 
court complaint should be filed seeking "public discipline." The form uses only the undefined 
phrase "formal complaint," which OPC conflates into an instruction to file a complaint in district 
court, which may not be at all what the screening panel had in mind. 
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Box 5 authorizes a formal complaint when the offense is negligent but only when two 
additional factors are present, potential injury to the public or the legal system; and the lawyer 
has been disciplined previously (within five years). Sonnenreich has no disciplinary history and 
box 5 was not checked. There was no finding of potential harm. 
Box 6 allows a formal complaint for negligent misconduct without a previous discipline 
only when there is "actual injury to a party, the public or the legal system or that there was actual 
interference with a legal proceeding..." That box was not checked. R 155. Moreover, OPC did 
not allege any actual injury. R 117-120. 
The screening panel chair checked box 7, that reserved for "intentional or knowing 
misconduct." However, the chair blacked out the words "intentional or knowing" and wrote in 
"negligently." R 155. 
Had the screening panel chair followed the instructions he could never have reached 
box 7. The panel found only negligence in answering question 2: "the panel specifically finds 
that the respondent acted: Intentionally/knowingly; [or] negligently." The panel checked 
"negligently". R 154. The instructions are clear: if the intentional/knowingly box is checked, 
"check and complete paragraph 7 authorizing a formal complaint for intentional or knowing 
misconduct." R 154. That is the only path to box 7. 
Under the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the category under which 
misconduct that is negligent and harmless falls is an admonition. Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions 4.5. Those standards expressly state that an "[a]dmonition is nonpublic discipline." 
2.7. Judge Stirba was correct in her analysis that the screening panel's finding was inadequate to 
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meet RLDD ll(a)'s mandate that a screening panel find "probable cause to believe there are 
grounds for public disciple." Therefore only one of the two requirements was met. 
OPC did not follow either RLDD 11 or the screening panel's instructions. Had OPC read 
and followed Rule 11, it could not have filed the complaint since it knew from the screening 
panel report that the offense was harmless and negligent and was not therefore a finding of 
probable cause that there are ground for "public discipline" as required by Rule 11(a). 
Had OPC followed the screening panel's literal instructions it would have pleaded the charge 
based on the offense as to which the screening panel found probable cause, a single count of 
harmless negligence. It also would have filed against all of the respondents in the cases. R 53; 
R 43; R 703. OPC has failed to appeal from Judge Stirba's dispositive ruling on this point, 
which stands unassailed as the law of this case and disposes of this appeal. See Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure 9(f). This issue is not raised in the docketing statement or Brief16 
VIII. THE COMPLAINT DOES NOT CONTAIN A "PLAIN AND CONCISE" 
STATEMENT OF "THE FACTS UPON WHICH THE CHARGE IS BASED"; 
The OPC launches a gratuitous and unfair attack on Judge Stirba's determination that 
the screening panel found no Rule 8 violation. Judge Stirba was entirely correct. First, OPC 
never alleged a RPC 8.4(a) violation. R 117. Moreover, the screening panel never found any 
violation of RPC 8.4 or any of its subparts. OPC charged Sonnenreich with several RPC 8.4 
violations including 8.4(b) and 8.4(c). Those charges were specifically rejected. 
OPC never asked the screening panel to determine whether Sonnenreich's conduct as 
charged actually violated RPC 8.4(a). Instead it preprinted a violation of Rule 8.4(a) on the form. 
OPC claimed it was authorized to pre-print the RPC 8.4(a) violation by a decision from the 
Mississippi Supreme Court. That decision, Terrell v. Mississippi Bar, 662 So. 2d 586 (Miss. 
1995) says no such thing. It involved a sufficiency of evidence review after a fact finding not a 
preprinted violation on a screening panel form. In any event, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
cannot authorize OPC to avoid having a Utah screening panel answer the key question: is the 
alleged conduct as to which you found probably cause serious enough that you want it to be 
treated as a breach of the ethics rules per RPC 8.4(a). 
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JUDGE STIRBA DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THAT 
BASIS. OPC WAS ALSO UNABLE TO PRESENT ANY FACTS SUPPORTING 
THE COMPLAINT TO JUDGE BURTON EVEN TO SAVE ITSELF FROM A 
FINDING IT ACTED IN BAD FAITH. 
OPC has never identified any acts of Sonnenreich that could constitute either practicing 
law or holding herself out as an attorney. Instead, OPC merely "contends that Sonnenreich 
continued to practice law and hold herself out as an attorney after she had been administratively 
suspended." Brief at 5. 
RLDD 11(a) required OPC to file "a formal complaint setting forth in plain and concise 
language the facts upon which the charge of unprofessional conduct is based and the applicable 
provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct." (emphasis added). 
A fact is "an actual or alleged event or circumstance, as distinguished from its legal 
effect, consequence or interpretation." Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edition 1998). The 
complaint fails to identify a single event or circumstance concerning Sonnenreich practicing law 
or holding herself out as a lawyer. It contains only a conclusory assertion. 
Additionally, a lawyer's procedural due process rights include the right to knowledge of 
the charge before the proceedings commence because knowledge of the charge is essential to the 
lawyer's right to explain and defend. In re Ruffalo, supra; see, also, In re Worthen, supra (judge 
hailed before judicial conduct commission has right to be unambiguously informed as to specific 
issues he must meet). 
OPC filed the complaint only after OPC had completed its own investigation, which was 
so thorough it involved calling a law firm where Sonnenreich had not worked in a decade (see 
Fact U 10) and after OPC had conducted a screening panel hearing. If OPC had knowledge of 
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any actual or alleged "events or circumstances" involving Sonnenreich practicing law or holding 
herself out as a lawyer it would have been simple to set them forth in a short and concise 
statement. 
Before Judge Burton, Sonnenreich argued that OPC's inability to explain to whom 
Sonnenreich allegedly held herself out as a lawyer and for whom she practiced law and in what 
manner was powerful proof that the action was brought in bad faith. OPC did not respond by 
telling Judge Burton the factual basis for the charge. Instead, it merely repeated its earlier 
contention: 
OPC contends that Sonnenreich continued to practice law after she had 
been administratively suspended for non-payment of dues. 
R493. 
A contention that a rule was broken is not a "fact." The record is devoid of a single 
"fact" suggesting Sonnenreich practiced law during the period OPC claims Respondent was 
suspended. Due to the utter absence of facts from the complaint, Judge Stirba had no choice but 
to dismiss it. 
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IX. OPC HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF JUDGE 
BURTON'S DECISION THAT OPC ACTED IN BAD FAITH. OPC'S 
ATTEMPTS TO BLAME THE SCREENING PANEL AND MR. WILSON ARE 
FURTHER PROOF OF ITS BAD FAITH. OPC'S BAD FAITH IS MANIFEST. 
A. OPC Was Required to But Failed to Marshal the Evidence Supporting Judge 
Burton's Bad Faith Determination. 
The rules and principles of appellate procedure apply in attorney discipline case unless 
specifically overridden by the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. RLDD 17. In deciding 
the first case under the new disciplinary procedures adopted in 1997, this Court noted that it 
would, with one exception, adhere to its usual "scope of review" and overturn fact findings only 
when they are "arbitrary, capricious or plainly in error." The exception recognized by the Court 
was a reservation, based on its Constitutional role, of its discretion to draw different inferences 
from facts found by the district court. In re Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997); see also In 
re Ennenga, 37 P.3d 1150, 1153 (Utah 2001) (applying "clearly erroneous" standard of factual 
deference in reviewing a lawyer discipline matter). 
Marshaling is required when a fact finding concerning bad faith under Utah Code 
§ 78-27-56 is examined on appeal. Wardley Better Homes and Garden v. Cannon, 21 P.3d 235, 
238 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) ("a finding of bad faith is a factual question... [a]ppellants must 
marshal the evidence, citing... to all the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling.");17 See, also, 
Chipman v. Miller, 934 P.2d 1158, 1163 (Utah App 1997) (party should marshal in attacking bad 
17Reversed on other grounds, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 458 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 15. (Utah 2002). The court held that imputing an agent's bad faith to the principal 
raises a legal question, but did not disapprove the Court of Appeals conclusion that marshalling 
of evidence is required in challenging factual determinations of bad faith. Even if marshalling is 
not required, Judge Burton was correct. Id. 1J 14. 
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faith ruling but failure not fatal if only memorandum were reviewed); Utah Department of Social 
Services v. Abrams, 806 P.2d 1193 (Utah App. 1991). OPC has not even purported to marshal. 
Instead, it has presented the conclusions it "contends" it can establish. Brief at 5. 
Judge Burton acknowledged in his decision that he did not make his bad faith finding 
lightly. He recognized that a bad faith finding "was a serious matter." R 673. He however 
reviewed the affidavits and other evidence, observed OPC's demeanor before him, and found 
there was a "total lack of factual basis" for the action, particularly on the issue of notice, and it 
could not have been brought "with an honest belief in its propriety." R 674. The uncontroverted 
record facts set out below bear out that conclusion. 
Rather than marshaling the facts, OPC offers two excuses to this Court. It says it's the 
screening panel's fault and that Mr. Wilson, Chair of the Ethics and Discipline Committee, also 
signed the complaint, so OPC is not responsible. Those contentions are baseless and belied by 
the record. 
B. This Is Not the Screening Panel's Fault. 
OPC attempts on appeal to immunize itself from responsibility for its prosecution of 
Sonnenreich by arguing that the screening panel told it to bring the action and it had no discretion 
to do otherwise. Brief at 32. First, as explained above, the screening panel finding was made in 
defiance of the instructions and is legally inadequate to satisfy RLDD 11(a). Second, OPC's 
discretion is a matter of public record. One need look no further than OPC's last publicly posted 
report, for the year 1999 (available on the Bar's web sit at www.utahstatebar.org under the 
heading archives). That report outlines the discipline process. It contains a section heading 
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stating "Formal Not Filed." Far from indicating that OPC's has no discretion once the screening 
panel has found grounds for a formal complaint, the report explains: 
The Screening Panel may also recommend that a formal complaint be filed with 
the District Court. If the screening panel recommends that the case be filed as a 
formal complaint, negotiations can continue. 
OPC's 1999 Report at page 4. 
The statistical section of the report shows 25 cases in the category "cases voted formal 
not filed." Id. at page 8. 
Additionally, OPC never asked the screening panel to find any facts. It was not asked 
what, if anything, Sonnenreich did that constituted the practice of law or holding out. OPC can't 
neglect to have the screening panel tell it the facts then rely on the screening panel for its claim to 
a have a factual basis. Further, OPC told the screening panel the suspension was valid. It cannot 
rely on the screening panel to as proof of OPC's good faith basis for its own belief in the 
suspension's validity. 
OPC did not controvert that the screening panel "voted discipline" on all the similar 
cases screened that night but OPC ignored that instruction and again singled out Sonnenreich by 
filing in district court only against her. R 53; R47 R703. OPC offered Judge Burton no 
explanation. 
C. This is not Mr. Wilson's Fault. 
OPC attempts to immunize itself by suggesting the Chair of the Ethics and Discipline 
Committee vouched safe OPC by signing the complaint. Brief at 27. That is both unfair to 
Mr. Wilson and utterly lacking in factual basis in the record. If OPC had accurately apprised 
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Mr. Wilson of the facts underlying this matter and provided a copy of the screening panel report 
for his review, it would seem a simple matter for OPC to obtain an affidavit from Mr. Wilson to 
that effect. OPC did not do so. OPC failed to submit any evidence to Judge Burton 
demonstrating the circumstances around Mr. Wilson's signature. It did not demonstrate what 
materials were received by Mr. Wilson and what he was told before he signed off on the 
complaint. Without such evidence OPC was again resting on a mere contention. Indeed, the 
only evidence on the point is that Mr. Wilson signed a complaint that did not have a copy of the 
screening panel report attached. R 1-4. Mr. Wilson did not learn the facts from the face of the 
complaint. R 1-4. Nothing in the record establishes whether Mr. Wilson acted as safeguard or as 
a perfunctor. OPC also fails to cite any legal authority for the notion that Mr. Wilson's signature 
immunizes it. 
D. OPC's Bad Faith is Manifest 
OPC has failed to produce the RLDD 8 notice that it now claims was the instrument that 
worked the suspension. If OPC really believes it is such a notice of suspension that suspended 
Sonnenreich, it is inconceivable that it could believe this case was justified. It has not and cannot 
produce such a notice. R 24. 
Sonnenreich demonstrated that she received no notice of her suspension. OPC tries to 
save the prosecution by contending evidence of notice will be discovered. That tactic is long 
discredited. See Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). 
OPC has been given two chances before Judge Stirba (on the issue of the adequacy of its 
pleadings) and before Judge Burton in the context of bad faith to explain the events and 
567522v4 35 
circumstances surrounding Sonnenreich's alleged practice of law or holding out to practice. It 
has failed to do anything beyond reassert that it "contends" Sonnenreich did something that could 
constitute practicing or holding out. R 492-493; Brief at 5. 
OPC presents no evidence to rebut the evidence submitted by Sonnenreich that OPC's 
prosecution of her was both inconsistent with its treatment of other attorneys (including those 
caught practicing by the district court (R 53, R491-515, R703, R905)) and showing OPC's 
conduct was particularly vicious. See Facts 1fl[ 7, 10, above. On the latter point, the record 
demonstrates that OPC counsel contacted a firm where Sonnenreich had not worked in a decade 
and presented the matter as if she was investigating Sonnenreich for practicing while suspended 
as a matter of Bar discipline. R 653, 508-509. OPC never, before the screening panel, in the 
complaint or before Judge Stirba or Burton produced any evidence from those individuals. Facts 
If 10. Nor did OPC explain why they were contacted. OPC presented no evidence from that 
counsel to explain a good faith basis for her behavior or to rebut the conclusion that she singled 
out Sonnenreich because she reported OPC counsel's to the Bar director, nor to rebut 
Sonnenreich's evidence in any other way.18 
OPC grossly overcharged Sonnenreich before the screening panel Rl 17. When the 
screening panel found only a single harmless and negligent violation, OPC was not deterred. 
R 155. Although a negligent and harmless violation cannot satisfy RLDD 11 fs requirement that 
the screening panel find grounds for "public discipline," OPC was undeterred. It simply omitted 
the screening panel report when it filed the complaint. R 1-4. OPC did not plead what the panel 
i8The Birrell affidavit goes to other issues; it does not controvert Sonnenreich's affidavits. 
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found, R 155. Nor did it treat all the cases OPC took to the screening panel level alike although 
Sonnenreich asserted (and OPC failed to deny that) the panel so instructed. R 53, R 703. 
In essence, the record before Judge Burton demonstrated that OPC prosecuted 
Sonnenreich for practicing while suspended: without being able to give a consistent explanation 
for the legal theory underlying the suspension, without producing any notice to her, without 
rebutting the fact that Sonnenreich did not receive notice; and without being able to explain what 
Sonnenreich allegedly did that constituted either practicing law or holding out. OPC admitted 
that its case is premised on the "hope" that "subsequently down the line" it will "meet its burden 
of proof with regard to due process and notice given." R 904 at page 13. Lawsuits must have a 
good faith basis when they are filed, a "hope" to find a way to meet the burden of proof in the 
future is not adequate. 
X. OPC ALSO FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE ON THE ATTORNEYS' 
FEES AMOUNT ISSUE. 
OPC was required to marshal evidence concerning attorneys fees. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 
961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998), (appellant should have marshaled on attorneys' fees amount). 
Eggett v, Wasatch Energy, 29 P.3d 668, 672 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) (appellant could not raise 
issue as to whether judge erred in not requiring apportionment of attorneys' fees because 
appellant did not marshal). Instead of marshaling, OPC has resorted to a potshots approach in 
which it unfairly presents isolated and out of context criticisms of Judge Burton's attorneys' fee 
award. 
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Once Judge Burton found OPC violated, Utah Code §78-27-56. He had broad discretion 
in determining what constitutes a reasonable fee. Valcarce, supra. The standard of review 
requires OPC to demonstrate "patent error" or a "clear abuse of discretion." Valcarce at 316. It 
has failed to demonstrate that there was any abuse of discretion, let alone a patent error or clear 
abuse by Judge Burton. 
OPC argues in essence that Sonnenreich's counsel is over-qualified and has too much 
experience and expertise. It asserts that only attorneys' fees charged by attorneys who 
customarily defend attorney discipline cases are relevant. That is not what the case it cites at 
page 35 of its Brief says: 
The choice of a lawyer, and the value of his services, may depend upon a number 
of factors, including his background of learning and experience, his ability, his 
integrity and his dedication to the causes with which he identifies himself. Also 
to be considered his the reputation he has acquired, the nature and importance of 
the matter, and the amount of money or value of property involved. . . .What the 
lawyer has to offer should be determined by considering the composite of all of 
the factors which the parties themselves think relevant. Within the limits of 
reason and good conscience, and where there is no over-reaching undue influence 
or oppression, the parties should be at liberty to contract as they desire. 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1385 (Utah 1980). The threat to a professional license and an 
accusation that a lawyer is unethical is a matter of great import and "deepest emotional content." 
Id. 
This matter is of paramount importance to Sonnenreich who has practiced law since 1986 
with a spotless disciplinary record. OPC has sought to ruin her reputation and to impose on her a 
penalty so severe it "is sufficient in most cases to destroy an attorney's practice and is tantamount 
to disbarment." In re Smith, 872 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah 1994) (internal quotes omitted). In light of 
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the importance of this matter it was not unreasonable for Sonnenreich to retain Jones Waldo as 
counsel. OPC's argument also ignores the fact that Mr. Lowrie's affidavit addresses the 
reasonableness of the hourly rate in light of both Jones, Waldo and general Salt Lake City fees 
for civil litigation-which is the area of legal expertise that should be examined. Indeed, Jones 
Waldo was not counsel to Sonnenreich until litigation was filed. OPC attempts to present 
discipline matters as something other than civil litigation. Brief at 33. It fails to cite In re 
Ennenga, 37 P.3d 1150, 1155 (Utah 2001) (rejecting ex-post facto law analysis in bar discipline 
case on the basis that bar discipline is civil litigation); see also RLDD 1(c) (discipline 
proceedings are civil). 
OPC also asserts that fees could not be awarded for Sonnenreich's successful disposal of 
OPC's untimfely appeal to this Court. Brief at pages 37-38. In fact, Judge Burton's subsequent 
determination that the action was brought in bad faith mandated an award of fees for the appeal. 
Utah Department of Social Services v. Adams, supra at 1197 (party awarded fees below is also 
entitled to fees on appeal). 
OPC proceeds through the nit picking exercise of challenging a variety of line items on 
the bills on such utterly non-sensible grounds as a claim that because Mr. Lowrie looked at the 
Utah Code and conducted research, he was unqualified and lacked experienced and should not be 
allowed fees. Brief at page 36. OPC cites, as an example of Mr. Lowrie's putative naivete, his 
research on the issue of whether a jury trial should be requested as indicative of an issue that can 
be resolved "by a glance at the RLDD." Brief at 36. If OPC had researched the issue it would 
know that while RLDD provides for a bench trial, at the time the research was performed, Utah 
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Code § 78-51-25 stated that one accused of practicing law while tardy on fees was "entitled to a 
trial by jury." That statute was repealed only after this litigation was filed. See Annotation Notes 
to Utah Code §§ 78-51-1 to 78-51-45. Also, the pertinent Rules for Integration did not speak to 
the issue of inconsistent rules and statutes. The fruits of that research were ultimately presented 
to Judge Stirba at page 16 of Sonnenreich's successful reply memorandum. R 231. 
Likewise, fees for the Rule 11 Motion sent to OPC are perfectly reasonable. OPC lost the 
substantive issue raised in that motion. If OPC had read and followed the authority cited therein 
it could have avoided a loss before this Court. It was highly reasonable to try to persuade OPC to 
not file an unsuccessful appeal. 
OPC also asserts that no fees should be awarded for the preparation of papers not listed in 
the Rules of Civil Procedure. That novel assertion is unsupported by any authority and fails to 
take into account that many of the papers routinely submitted by lawyers are not specified by 
name in the Civil Procedure Rules, for example a there is no such thing as a motion for 
reconsideration yet OPC filed one. R 290. OPC called it a Notice of Objection to Proposed 
Judgment but it was a drawn out rehash of the merits. 
At page 39 of its Brief, OPC claims that "the affidavit includes charges attributable to 
legal work performed by Sonnenreich." That contention is unsupported by the itemization 
included with the Mr. Lowrie's Affidavits. As explained in the First Affidavit, Sonnenreich, did 
the lion's share of the research and initial drafting of pleadings on this matter. It was not at all 
unreasonable for Mr. Lowrie who ultimately signed and submitted the papers to review the 
research and arguments. 
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CONCLUSION 
This matter should have ended when Sonnenreich called the Bar, found out her credit 
card had not been process and paid her dues and the $100.00 reinstatement fee. There are ample 
grounds for affirming both the dismissal of the complaint and also the award of fees. OPC has 
failed to preserve issues, failed to marshal evidence and, Sonnenreich submits, failed to persuade. 
This Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of the complaint and its award of 
attorneys' fees. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of December, 2002. 
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough PC 
James S. Lowrie 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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